Capital Defense Journal
Volume 7

Issue 2

Article 7

Spring 3-1-1995

BURKET v. COMMONWEALTH 248 Va. 596,450 S.E.2d 124 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
BURKET v. COMMONWEALTH 248 Va. 596,450 S.E.2d 124 (1994) Supreme Court of Virginia, 7 Cap. Def.
Dig. 17 (1995).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol7/iss2/7

This Casenote, Va. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital
Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

CapitalDefense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2 - Page 17
Had Weeks not been held to have defaulted this second claim,
however, he may have had aviable argument. The United States Supreme
Court stated in Payne (in a passage that the Supreme Court of Virginia
quoted verbatim in Weeks) that"[a] State may legitimately conclude that
evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the
victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the
death penalty should be imposed."' 78 The Court's holding says nothing
about such testimony being admitted as to any persons other than family

members. Consequently, defense counsel should object if the Commonwealth attempts to put on victim impact testimony as to anyone other than
family members. This issue should be distinguished from objecting to
victim impact testimony by family members, so as to avoid the fate of
default that Weeks suffered. If overruled, counsel should preserve the
issue on federal constitutional grounds so that it may ultimately be
resolved on its merits in a federal habeas proceeding.
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig

78 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (emphasis added).

BURKET v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 596,450 S.E.2d 124 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia

FACTS

HOLDING

On January 14, 1993, Katherine Tafelski and her daughter Ashley,
age five, were found dead in their beds in the family residence. Autopsies
revealed that both victims suffered massive head injuries, inflicted by the
same blunt object. Katherine suffered sexual penetration by an inanimate
object. It was determined that the victims' wounds were inflicted by
automotive tools. Katherine's son Andrew, age three, was found unconscious in his bed, suffering a double break in his jaw and an eye wound.
The children's friend, Chelsea Brothers, suffered bruises to her entire
body. I
Russel Burket lived next door to the Tafelskis. During a videotaped
police station interrogation on January 20,1993, Burket confessed to the
murders and assaults. 2 Burket was charged with double homicide, two
counts of malicious wounding, sexual penetration with an inanimate
object, and statutory burglary. After the trial court denied a motion to
suppress the confession, Burketpled guilty to all the charges butreserved
3
the right to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his statements.
In a separate penalty hearing, Burket received two life sentences
and two twenty year terms for the four non-capital convictions.4 Burket
was sentenced to death for the capital murder, predicated upon findings
of both "future dangerousness" and "vileness." 5
Burket appealed only the capital murder conviction. Among his
assignments of error, Burket argued it was error for the trial court not to
suppress his confession which was obtained in a custodial interrogation
in violation of his Miranda rights and Fifth Amendment right to coun6
sel.

Consolidating the automatic review ofBurket's death sentence with
his appeal of the capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court of
7
Virginia found no reversible error on any of the presented issues,
8
including the admissibility of Burket's confession.

I Burketv. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596,599-602,450S.E.2d 124,
126-27 (1994).
2 248 Va. at 602-04,450 S.E.2d at 128-29.
3 248 Va. at 598-99,450 S.E.2d at 125-26.
4 248 Va. at 599, 450 S.E.2d at 126.
5 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
6 Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 604, 450 S.E.2d at 129.
7 In light of Burket's failure to raise at trial the issues of victim
impact testimony and parole eligibility, the Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to address the issues on appeal. 248 Va. at 612-613, 616, 450
S.E.2d at 133, 135. See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25. Burket also argued that the

death penalty was imposed contrary to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and his right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. These challenges were also summarily dismissed by the court on the basis of precedent. 248 Va. at 612,
450 S.E.2d at 133.
8 248 Va. at 617,450 S.E.2d at 135.
9 248 Va. at 604,450 S.E.2d at 129.
10 Id.
11 248 Va. at 608,450 S.E.2d at 131.
12 248 Va. at 611, 450 S.E.2d at 132.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In upholding the admissibility of Burket's confession, the Supreme
Court of Virginia rejected the Miranda violations alleged by Burket.
First, Burket claimed that his initial request for counsel was made in a
custodial interrogation, thereby triggering his right to Mirandawarnings
which were not administered until after detectives obtained a full-blown
confession.9 Second, given the detectives' failure to immediately issue
the Miranda wamings, Burket claimed his later custodial statements
were rendered inadmissible. 10 Third, after finally being advised of his
Mirandarights, Burket argued that they were violated by the failure of
his interrogators to terminate questioning. 11 Finally, Burket alleged the
12
trial court erred in finding that he validly waived his Mirandarights.
Based on the trial court findings and its own independent review of the
record, the court found no merit to any of these claims.
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I. The Custody Inquiry
On the afternoon ofJanuary 20,1993, Burket agreed to accompany
two detectives to the police station for an interview. Forty minutes into
the interrogation, the detectives falsely informed Burket that children
had seen him inside the Tafelski residence and that strands of his hair
were also discovered in the house. 13 In response to these allegations,
Burket admitted he had been in the house on the day of the murders and
14
stated, "I'm gonna need a lawyer."
The Supreme Court of Virginia was not persuaded by Burket's
argument thathe was in custody atthis pointand accordingly should have
been read his Mirandarights. To the contrary, the courtfound that Burket
was free to leave at this juncture, and the detectives were therefore not
required to advise Burket of his Mirandarights. 15
It is true that Burket was not formally in custody when he requested
counsel. It is equally clear that the Miranda right to counsel does not
attach until the suspect is in custody. 16 However, the Court only focused
on formal arrest as the event triggering the custodial right to Miranda
warnings. While this is a proper focus, it is not the only indicator of
custody. A suspect may in fact be in custody without having been
formally arrested. InBerkemerv.McCarty1 7 the United States Supreme
Court stated that in determining whether a person not under formal arrest
is in custody, "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect's position would have understood his situation." 18 Yet the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia contained no reference to how
Russel William Burket or a reasonable person in his position would have
understood the situation.
To the contrary, the opinion contained multiple references to what
the interrogating officers said and did throughout the relevant period.
The court emphasized that the officers went to Burket's home to ask him
to participate in an interview and then drove Burket to the police station
in an unmarked car; that Burket was never handcuffed or restrained and
was told more than once that he was free to leave; and that Burket was
19
placed in a small, unlocked interview room in order to ensure privacy.
By recounting the events leading up to the interrogation exclusively from
the perspective of the officers, the court altogether failed to consider the
episode from the suspect's point of view. While the actions of the officers
were unquestionably relevant to what a reasonable person would have
understood, the scope of review should not have been limited solely to
the police version of the facts.
Although the court did not undertake a reasonableness analysis, it
nevertheless acknowledged that the investigating detectives affirmatively misled Burket in the opening hour of the interrogation. 20 The
detectives created a ruse by telling Burket that they possessed both
eyewitness accounts and hard evidence of his presence in the Tafelski

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

248 Va. at 603,450 S.E.2d at 128.
Id.
248 Va. at 609-10,450 S.E.2d at 129-30.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,469 (1966).
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
Id.at 442.
Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 603, 450 S.E.2d at 128.
Id.
Id.
248 Va. at 611,450 S.E.2d at 132.
429 U.S. 492 (1977).
Id.at 495.
Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 606, 450 S.E.2d at 130.

house. Confronted with this information, Burket obviously perceived a
case against him and responded by stating his need for a lawyer.
Moreover, the detectives sent mixed signals to Burket as to his
21
status. There were occasional admonishments that he was free to leave,
but when viewed in the greater context, these statements may reasonably
have seemed like empty words to Burket. Burket was a man of less than
average intelligence 22 who was detained in a small interrogation room
with two pressing detectives. In Oregonv. Mathiason23 the United States
Supreme Court stated that police are required to give Mirandawarnings
prior to questioning "only when the suspect is so restricted as to be in
custody."'24 Given the restrictive circumstances of Burket's detention,
it would not have been unreasonable to conclude that he was in fact in
custody and deserving of his Mirandarights.
II. Failure to Invoke Miranda Rights
Despite Burket's initial request for a lawyer, the interrogation
continued until Burket admitted to the killings, terming them accidental. 25 Immediately following this admission, Burket again indicated his
desire for the assistance of counsel when he stated, "I think I need a
lawyer." After this statement Burket was frisked, placed under arrest and
read his Mirandarights.26 According to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
Burket was not in custody forMirandaself-incrimination purposes until
after this formal three-step process-frisk, arrest and warnings-had
concluded. 27 The implications to be drawn from this finding are dual:
Not only may precustodial requests for counsel be safely ignored for
Mirandapurposes, but, more critically, if a suspect does not repeat his
request for counsel after being placed into custody, any subsequent
28
custodial confessions will be deemed voluntary and admissible.
After Burket was placed under arrest, a detective began to elicit
personal information from him in order to complete preliminary paperwork.29 The trial court found that Burket then initiated post-Miranda
conversation with the detective, apart from the requested booking
information. However, the record itself is quite susceptible of a contrary
interpretation.
Twice during the interrogation Burket exclaimed, "Ijust don't think
'30
that I should say anything," and "I need somebody that I can talk to."
These exclamations were followed by an explicit threat from one of the
interrogating officers who warned that if Burket did not cooperate, the
severity of the situation would only escalate. The officer also made it
quite clear to Burket that the degree of severity lay exclusively within the
officer's control. 31 The officer then resumed his questioning and for the
third time Burket stated, "I need somebody that I can talk to."'32 Based
on the foregoing exchange, Burket claimed that his statements indicated
his desire and right to halt the interrogation. The Supreme Court of

26 248 Va. at 606-07, 450 S.E.2d at 130.
27 248 Va. at 605, 450 S.E.2d at 129.
28 These issues have been raised in Burket v. Commonwealth,
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 2, 1995)(No. 94-__.
29 In Pennsylvaniav. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990), a plurality
announced a"'routine booking question' exception which exempts from
Miranda's coverage express questions to secure the biographical data
necessary to complete booking or pretrial services."
30
Burket v.Commonwealth,248 Va. at 609-10,450 S.E.2d at 13131 248 Va. at 609, 450 S.E.2d at 131.
32 248 Va. at 610,450 S.E.2d at 131-32.
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Virginia disagreed with this characterization, finding that these remarks
did not amount to an invocation by Burket of his right to terminate the
questioning. 33 This means that not only did Burket fail to invoke his right
to counsel, but he also did not invoke his right to remain silent.
A. Invocation of the Right to Counsel
Burket did not claim on appeal that his statements, of "I need
somebody I can talk to" were requests for counsel. Yet even if he had
made such a claim, it undoubtedly would have failed. This is due to the
court's position regarding the degree of specificity and clarity that a
suspect's request for counsel must meet. As stated in Eatonv. Commonwealth,34 "the standard prevailing in Virginia is that a request for counsel
must be 'unambiguous and unequivocal'...." This means that if a
suspect's statements regarding counsel are susceptible of varying interpretations by a reasonable police officer, the issue will be resolved in
favor of the Commonwealth. 35 Given this linguistically high threshold, 36 it seems clear that the court would have refused to read Burket's
statements as effective requests for counsel.
An important consequence flowed from Burket's failure to clearly
invoke his right to counsel at this point in the interrogation. When a
suspect exercises his right to counsel under Miranda,he simultaneously
triggers the non-waiver rule announced by the United States Supreme
Courtin Edwardsv. Arizona.37 UnderEdwards,when a suspect invokes
his right under Mirandato counsel, he "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless [defendant] himself initiates further communication, exchanges,
or conversations with the police.' 38 The underlying purpose of the
Edwards rule is to "prevent police from badgering a defendant into
waiving his previously asserted Mirandarights."39 Thus by not clearly
and unambiguously requesting an attorney, Burket forfeited the protective mandate of Edwards.
B. Scrupulously Honoring the Right to Remain Silent
If not requests for counsel, Burket claimed that his three statements
to detectives were an invocation of his right to remain silent. Under the
rule of Michiganv. Mosley,40 once a suspect has made a decision not to
speak, officers may not immediately press for further statements. In other
words, a suspect's expressed desire to remain silent is to be "scrupulously
honored" by police. 4 1 Accordingly, Burket asked the Court to determine
whether his right to terminate questioning had been "scrupulously
honored" by his interrogator. The court's answer to that inquiry would in
turn determine the admissibility of Burket's confession.
As stated above, Burket voiced his unwillingness to talk to the
detectives, not once, but three times in a row. Furthermore, between his
second and third request to end the questioning, Burket was threatened
by one of the detectives. This is exactly the type of police behavior that

33 Id.
34 240 Va. 236, 253, 397 S.E.2d 385, 395 (1990).
35 See Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (holding that
a suspect's post-Mirandarequest for counsel must be clear and unambiguous before police are constitutionally required to stop questioning).
36
For greater explanation of the Supreme Court ofVirginia's views
regarding the invocation of counsel issue, see Bieber, Burket v. Commonwealth: Don'tPutAll YourDefense Eggs in the SuppressionBasket,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
37 451 U.S. 477 (1981), reh'g denied,452 U.S. 973 (1981).
38 Id. at 484-85.
39 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
40 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
41 Id. at 104.

the Mosley rule prohibits. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that Burket failed to invoke his right to remain silent and that he
had, in fact, persisted in engaging the detectives in a detailed discussion
of the case. 42
The court viewed Burket's statements to the officers as nothing
more than "a reservation about the wisdom of continuing the interrogation. ' 43 This implies that something more is required to halt questioning.
The court did not, however, advise what language or action by the suspect
would be sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent. Expressions that
one does not think he should speak, coupled with expressions of a desire
to speak with someone other than the interrogator, are obviously insufficient in Virginia. Having decided that Burket failed to invoke his right
to remain silent, the court never reached the Mosley issue regarding the
duty to scrupulously honor the defendant's right to silence.
UT. Valid Waiver and the Government's Burden of Proof
Burket argued that the trial court erred in finding that he validly
waived his Mirandarights. A suspect may waive his privilege against
self-incrimination and right to counsel before or during the custodial
interrogation. However, before accepting such a waiver, it is the duty of
the court to uncover the true nature of the waiver by applying the standard
of review set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst.44 Under the Zerbst test, an
alleged waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent in order to be valid as a matter of law.45 The Supreme Court
of Virginia's manifestation of this test is that the waiver must be the
"product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker" 46
and the court must determine whether the maker's will "has been
' 47
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.
It was established in the trial court proceedings that Burket suffered
from severe dyslexia and his academic abilities were severely impaired.
Burket's intellectual abilities were assessed as falling in the lower level
of the average range. It was also opined that Burket suffered from
persistent depression and had twice attempted suicide. 48 Notwithstanding this evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld as substantial
and credible the lower court's findings that Burket's "demeanor was that
of an alert, composed, even knowledgeable individual. There was
nothing unusual about his behavior." 49 Accordingly, the court held the
50
waiver to be valid and the confession voluntary.
IV. Other Issues
Prominent among Burket's other claims was the argument that he
was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial by virtue of the trial
court's refusal to allow an explanation to the jury of his minimum period
of imprisonment if given a life sentence. Under the recent holding of
Simmons v. South Carolina,5 1 trial courts may no longer refuse to
instruct juries that a life sentence means imprisonment without parole.

42 Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 610,450 S.E.2d at 132.
43 Id.
44 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
45 "This Court has always set high standards ofproof for the waivei
of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation." Mirandav. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 475 (citation omitted).
46 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
47 Id.
48 Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 613,450 S.E.2d at 133.
49 248 Va. at 611,450 S.E.2d at 132.
50 248 Va. at 612, 450 S.E.2d at 133.
51
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
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However, due to Burket's failures to raise the issue in the trial court52 and
assign it as error on appeal, 53 the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to
consider the merits of the issue. Burket's loss ofthe Simmons issue is yet
another example of how procedural default is a trap for the unwary.
Interestingly, in spite of Burket's guilty plea, the court nevertheless
reviewed the penalty phase issues raised by the defense. 54 This may
signal a movement away from the court's earlier pronouncements that
"[w)hen an accused enters a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty to an
55
offense he waives all defenses except those jurisdictional."
Much to the credit of the defense, an extensive case in mitigation
was put on in the penalty phase of the proceedings. Yet this very
presentation of evidence exemplifies why a capital defendant should not
plead guilty without an agreement that he will receive a sentence less than
death. By pleading guilty without such assurances, the defendant waives

all appellate questions regarding guidance ofjury discretion in sentencing56 and drastically reduces any chance of appellate relief.
Finally, the Burket decision confirms that as of yet, the Supreme
Court ofVirginia has not found any Fifth or Sixth Amendment problems
with any confession in the history of the modem capital murder statute.

52 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
53 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:17.
54
Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. at 613-16, 450 S.E.2d at 13335. Specifically, Burket argued that the trial court erred in finding the
prosecution's expert witness more credible than the defense expert
witnesses and in not considering all the evidence in mitigation. The
Court found these challenges to be without merit. Id.
55 Savino v. Commonwealth,239Va. 534,539,391 S.E.2d276,278
(1990). See also Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 131-32, 376
S.E.2d 288, 291 (1989).

56 For example, a meritorious and unresolved challenge to the
"vileness" factor may be lost because the trial judge is presumed to apply
a proper limiting construction. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639
(1990), reh'gdenied,497 U.S. 1050 (1990); see alsoLago,Litigatingthe
"Vileness" Factor,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991).
57 For a more thorough discussion of the state of confession law in
Virginia, see Bieber, Burket v. Commonwealth: Don't Put All Your
Defense Eggs in the SuppressionBasket, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.

V. Conclusion
The motion to suppress has not proven to be an effective tool for the
Virginia capital defendant. The motion should not be abandoned, but by
the same token the defense strategy certainly should not hinge on its
57
success.
Summary and analysis by:
Jody M. Bieber

WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 528,450 S.E.2d 365 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS

HOLDING

Michael Wayne Williams was tried upon indictments charging him
with twelve felonies, five of which were capital murder charges for the
killing of Morris C. and Mary Elizabeth Keller. 1 At the guilt phase of a
bifurcated trial conducted under Virginia Code sections 19.2-264.3 and
264.4, a jury convicted Williams of all twelve charges. At the penalty
phase, the jury fixed the punishment for both capital murders at death
based on both the "future dangerousness" and "vileness" aggravators.
Williams appealed his capital murder convictions. 2 The Supreme Court
of Virginia consolidated his appeal with their automatic review of his
3
death sentences under Virginia Code section 17-110.1(A).

The Supreme Court of Virginia conducted its mandatory review of
the imposition of Davidson's death sentence, denied his appeal and
4
affirmed the trial court's actions.
Among the many issues raised and briefed on appeal, 5 the court
stated that it would not consider certain contentions by Williams because
they were not contained in his brief or were "incorporated by reference"
to arguments made in the trial court.
In response to Williams' argument that the Commonwealth is
required, by means of a bill or particulars, to "identify every narrowing
construction of [the "vileness"] factor on which it intends to offer

1 Two of the capital murder charges were based on Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-31 (d) (1990) (murder in the course of a robbery while armed with
a deadly weapon); two indictments were based on Va. Code Ann. § 18.231 (e) (1990) (murder subsequent to rape); the fifth indictment was based
on Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (g) (1990) (murder of more than one person
as a part of the same act or transaction).
2 Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528,532,450 S.E.2d 365,
369 (1994).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 528, 450 S.E.2d at 379.
5 Some of the errors briefed on appeal were rejected in brief,
conclusive language. Arguments in this category that will not be
addressed in this summary include: 1) the Virginia capital murder statute

does not give meaningful guidance to ajury because it does not require
the jury to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances; (2) the statute fails to inform the jury that it must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors; (3) the statute fails to provide sufficient guidance to
the jury to assure that the death penalty is not applied arbitrarily or
capriciously; (4) the "future dangerousness" aggravator is inherently
misleading; (5) the part of the statute that allows a finding of "future
dangerousness" to be based on unadjudicated criminal conduct is unconstitutional; (6) if unadjudicated acts are allowed, the jury should be
instructed that they must only be considered if established beyond a
reasonable doubt; (7) the "future dangerousness" aggravator is inherently unreliable and insufficient to guide a jury's discretion; (8) the

